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SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 4E(A):
TOOTHLESS “INTERNAL-TIMING DIRECTIVE” OR
STATUTE OF LIMITATION?
RICHARD E. BRODSKY*
ABSTRACT
The Securities and Exchange Commission has a problem, and
everyone knows it: its investigative process suffers from excessive
delay, which harms both individuals and entity it investigates and
its own enforcement program. This problem has long been recognized and complained about, but never remedied.
In 2010, Congress passed a law specifically designed to solve
the problem of excessive delay but, the way the SEC has read the
law—which has been acquiesced in by the courts and ignored by
subsequent Congresses—has rendered it toothless and essentially
meaningless. This has been accomplished, first, by the Commission’s cabined interpretation of the purpose of the law and its flawed
review of supposed Supreme Court precedent, and then by the lower
courts’ overly strong deference to this administrative agency’s
reading of a law designed to curb its penchant for excessive delay.
Even though the problem of excessive delay remains unsolved and unchanged, there has been no serious published analysis of the 2010 law or of the courts’ (or of the SEC’s) reading of that
law. The purposes of this Article are first, to attempt to quantify
the problem of excessive delay; and second, to explore, in more
depth than it appears has ever been assayed, both the 2010 law
and the court decisions that have considered it, to the end of determining whether new life can properly be breathed into this
Richard E. Brodsky is an attorney in private practice in Coral Gables, Florida.
Formerly an attorney with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s
Division of Enforcement, he has represented clients in Commission investigations and proceedings since 1981. The views he expresses in this Article are his
own and not of any client or other person. Thanks are offered to Professor
Andrew N. Vollmer for providing very thoughtful and helpful suggestions,
but errors and omissions are solely the responsibility of the author.
*
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law. I conclude that the 2010 law, while hardly a model of ideal
statutory craftsmanship, should be viewed as an actual deadline,
akin to a statute of limitations. Or, Congress should revisit the issue
of unnecessary delay and enact a clearer and more meaningful
legislative solution.
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INTRODUCTION
Few would question that “an effective enforcement program” on the part of the Securities and Exchange Commission “is
necessary to maintain investor confidence in the integrity, fairness, and efficiency of our securities markets.”1 There is, though,
a valid question whether a fair and effective enforcement program2
can coexist with excessive delay in the process. And there is no
question that SEC enforcement is and has long been dogged by
excessive delay.3
I talk of “excessive delay,” not delay per se. Obviously, it takes
time for the SEC Staff to conclude an investigation and decide
whether to drop the matter or recommend that the Commission
authorize an enforcement action, and for the Commission to consider and act on that recommendation. Indeed, given the SEC’s
status and the enormous power it wields,4 it would be highly
inappropriate for the Commission to proceed on the premise that
investigative speed is the sole or even the only important measure
1 Securities Litigation Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm.
& Fin. of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 173rd Cong. 237 (1994) (statement
of Mark J. Griffin, Dir., Div. of Sec., Utah Dep’t of Commerce) [hereinafter
Hearing].
2 There are many books, treatises, law review articles, study materials
and web sites exploring all aspects of SEC enforcement. Readers of this Article must look elsewhere for a comprehensive understanding of that process.
One very valuable—though somewhat outdated, because of intervening changes in
the law—source among many is William R. McLucas et al., A Practitioner’s
Guide to the SEC’s Investigative and Enforcement Process, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 53
(1997). Another useful source is the SEC & EX. COMM’N DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT,
OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 4–5 (2017), https://www.sec.gov
/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/J95Z-258G]. For
purposes of this Article, the reader merely needs to know that: SEC investigations
are commenced and conducted by staff members of the Division of Enforcement,
whether resident in the Home Office or in one or more of the Commission’s
eleven regional offices; when they finish investigations, the SEC Staff may,
but need not, give prospective targets of an enforcement action notice of the
likely charges (called, for reasons discussed in this Article, a “Wells notice”);
and no enforcement action alleging a violation of the federal securities laws
may be filed without authorization by the Commission, consisting of a maximum of 5 members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
3 See generally Hearing, supra note 1, at 199–200 (statement of Michael J.
Cook).
4 As the SEC puts it in its Canon of Ethics, “[t]he power to investigate carries with it the power to defame and destroy.” 17 C.F.R. § 200.66 (1963).

2020]

SECTION 4E: TOOTHLESS OR NOT

327

of the quality of its enforcement efforts: investigative due care
and effective supervision are equally or more important in order to
distinguish between those who are properly named in an SEC enforcement action and those who are not. The issue is finding the
proper balance between unduly dragging things out and rushing
to a premature enforcement action.
This not a new problem. Excessive delay has long been identified as a problem at the SEC but, until 2010, had never been seriously addressed by Congress or the courts other than through a
generally applicable statute of limitations on certain types of relief
(fines, penalties, and forfeitures).5 Finally, in 2010, Congress, as
part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,6 enacted a provision explicitly aimed at speeding up the
enforcement process by adding Section 4E (“Deadline for Completing Examinations, Inspections and Enforcement Actions”) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.7 Section 4E(a)(1) states:
Not later than 180 days after the date on which [Securities and
Exchange] Commission staff provide a written Wells notification to any person, the Commission staff shall either file an
action against such person or provide notice to the Director of
the Division of Enforcement of its intent to not file an action.8

Section 4E(a)(2) allows for extensions of the 180-day deadline.9 It is obvious from even a cursory reading of section 4E(a) that
See, e.g., SEC, Office of Inspector Gen., Failure to Timely Investigate Allegations of Financial Fraud 1, 4 (2010); Marcy Gordon, SEC Official Pressed
on 12-Year Delay to Ponzi Case, NEWSDAY (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.newsday
.com/business/sec-official-pressed-on-12-year-delay-to-ponzi-case.
6 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 4E, 124 Stat. 1867 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of various of
the acts constituting the federal securities laws).
7 Id. § 4E(a)(1).
8 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5(a)(1) (2013); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5(b); § 4E(a)(1)
(containing parallel provisions for SEC compliance examinations and inspections of regulated entities such as broker-dealers). Section 4E(b) is outside the
scope of this Article.
9 Section 4E(a)(2) provides:
Notwithstanding paragraph (1), if the Director of the Division
of Enforcement of the Commission or the Director's designee determines that a particular enforcement investigation is sufficiently complex such that a determination regarding the filing
of an action against a person cannot be completed within the
deadline specified in paragraph (1), the Director of the Division
5
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it is a somewhat oddly worded statute. For one thing, it appears
to apply only when the Staff provides a written Wells notification, and says nothing about any deadlines applicable to situations
where the Staff chooses not to provide a Wells notice or where a
Wells notice occurs after an intolerably long investigation.10
Second, it speaks about the Staff’s filing an action, when, in fact,
the SEC as an agency files an action and only after a majority of
the Commissioners authorize a case.11 Third, it contains no requirement that the Staff actually close an investigation for which
they do not intend to file an action.12 None of these apparent
oddities has been mentioned by the SEC or the courts in interpreting section 4E.13
The deadline established in section 4E(a)(1) has demonstrated no practical effect.14 The SEC has done its best to ignore or
enfeeble the deadline contained in section 4E(a)(1) by interpreting it as an “internal-timing directive, designed to compel [the
SEC] staff to complete investigations, examinations, and inspections in a timely manner and not ... a statute of limitations.”15 In
other words, according to the SEC the deadline is a mere guideline
of Enforcement of the Commission or the Director’s designee may,
after providing notice to the Chairman of the Commission, extend such deadline as needed for one additional 180-day period.
If after the additional 180-day period the Director of the Division of Enforcement of the Commission or the Director’s designee determines that a particular enforcement investigation
is sufficiently complex such that a determination regarding the
filing of an action against a person cannot be completed within the additional 180-day period, the Director of the Division
of Enforcement of the Commission or the Director's designee may,
after providing notice to and receiving approval of the Commission, extend such deadline as needed for one or more additional successive 180-day periods.
§ 4E(a)(2) (emphases added).
10 In fact, it is well known that, almost universally, Wells notices are provided,
so this oddity has less significance than meets the eye. E.g., McLucas et al.,
supra note 2, at 113–14.
11 See id. at 56, 58.
12 See id. at 57, 111.
13 See generally § 4E, 124 Stat. at 1867.
14 See id.
15 In re Montford & Co., Inv. Advisors Act Release No. 3829, 108 SEC Docket
3763 (May 2, 2014) (affirming In re Montford & Company, Inc., Admin. Proc.
No. 3-14536, 2012 WL 1377372 (ALJ Apr. 20, 2012) (initial decision).
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of sorts, while providing no rights to those negatively affected by
its violation.16 And, in the only appellate decision interpreting
section 4E, the SEC’s interpretation was upheld by the D.C.
Circuit in Montford & Co., Inc. v. SEC,17 in which, purporting to
follow Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,18 the court overtly deferred to the SEC for its reading of this
provision.19 A few district courts, all preceding the D.C. Circuit’s
Montford decision, have also ruled that section 4E is not a statute of limitations.20
Neither the statute itself nor any of the judicial opinions
interpreting it has been the subject of any academic analysis, and
the D.C. Circuit’s analysis of the meaning and effect of section
4E has never been discussed in any published opinion, officially
or unofficially reported. Perhaps this reflects fewer attempts to
point to section 4E in defending SEC enforcement actions. Or perhaps defense lawyers have viewed the pursuit of this issue a
waste of time. For whatever reason that this issue is off the radar,
there is a definite need to conduct a fresh review of the meaning
and effect of section 4E. This is because this provision was obviously aimed at solving the problem of excessive delay but, years
after the enactment of section 4E, that problem still infects the
SEC enforcement process and has so far defied resolution.
In Part I of this Article, I discuss the problem of excessive
delay in SEC enforcement and trace previous efforts to identify
the problem and propose remedies.21 In Part II, I discuss the
various cases that have interpreted section 4E, principally the
Montford/SEC and Montford decisions, and explore in depths
See id.
793 F.3d 76, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (deferring to SEC’s “reasonable” interpretation of section 4E). In this Article, the SEC ALJ’s Initial Decision is
referred to as “Montford/ALJ,” the SEC’s Opinion in Montford & Co., Inc. as
“Montford/SEC,” and the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Montford and Co., Inc. v.
SEC as “Montford.”
18 467 U.S. 837, 837 (1984).
19 Montford, 793 F.3d at 81.
20 See SEC v. NIR Grp., LLC, No. CV 11-4723, 2013 WL 5288962, at *1, *3
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2013); SEC v. Levin, No. 12-21917-CIV, 2013 WL 594736
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2013); Memorandum, SEC v. Scammell, No. CV 11-6597 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 15, 2011), ECF No. 13. None of these cases plowed new ground and
therefore I do not separately analyze them.
21 See infra Part I.
16
17
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the cases on which the SEC’s Opinion and that of the D.C. Circuit relied.22 In Part III, I consider whether Montford appears to
have been decided correctly.23 I conclude that there is substantial reason to believe that it was not. In Part IV, I describe why
there should be life in section 4E, at least until the SEC itself
changes its view of the meaning and effect of this statutory provision, Congress enacts a more explicit statute, or courts see the
issue differently than they have so far.24
I.THE CONTINUING AND WORSENING PROBLEM OF EXCESSIVE
DELAY IN THE SEC ENFORCEMENT PROCESS
A.The Scope of the Problem
The problem of excessive delay in SEC enforcement and the
negative effects it causes investigatees and the public interest
(as embodied in a fair and effective SEC enforcement program)
are well established.25 In fact, years after Dodd-Frank, the limited
data made public by the Commission make it clear that the situation is getting much worse.26
According to the latest annual data published by the SEC,27
the average length of those investigations that led to an enforcement action—measured from commencement of the investigation to bringing an enforcement action—is now 25 months, a 19
percent increase since 2013,28 while the number of enforcement
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
24 See infra Part IV.
25 See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Off. of Inspector Gen. at 16, 17, 34.
26 See In re Montford & Co. at 3768, 3771; see also SEC, Fiscal Year 2020
Congressional Budget Justification Annual Performance Plan 123, 124
(2019), https://www.sec.gov/files/secfy20congbudgjust_0.pdf [https://perma.cc
/N583-JDAB].
27 One commentator, based on a review of fifteen years of SEC enforcement actions, has characterized the SEC’s published enforcement “metrics
[as] deeply flawed,” finding “that the widely-circulated statistics are invalid
because they do not measure what they purport to measure, and unreliable
because they are inconsistent and can be manipulated all too easily.” Urska
Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC's Enforcement
Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 901 (2016). Nevertheless, in her article
Professor Velikonja does not mention the statistics discussed below in n. 28.
28 Every year, the SEC reports to the Congress both “the average number
of months between the opening of an investigation and the filing of the first
22
23
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actions that are brought within 2 years of the opening of an investigation has dropped 22 percent since 2014.29 Every year, the
Commission admits that this length of time is too long: “Target:
enforcement action arising out of that investigation” and “the rate at which
the first enforcement action arising out of an investigation was filed within
two years of the opening of the investigation.” The data show that, for whatever reason—complexity of cases, loss of manpower, or simple inadequacy of
performance—the length of SEC investigations has grown from twenty-one or
twenty-two months to twenty-five months in this decade:
Fiscal Year
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

Average Number Months
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
22
21
21
21
24
24
24
25

Percent Within 2 Years
54
62
70
67
61
63
58
64
58
53
52
49

SEC, Fiscal Year 2020 Congressional Budget Justification Annual Performance Plan 123, 124 (2019), https://www.sec.gov/files/secfy20congbudgjust_0
.pdf [https://perma.cc/N583-JDAB]; SEC, Fiscal Year 2019 Congressional
Budget Justification & Annual Performance Plan 109, 110 (2018), https://www
.sec.gov/reports-and-publications/budget-reports/secfy19congbudgjust [https://
perma.cc/42Q2-WB5M]; SEC, Fiscal Year 2018 Congressional Budget Justification Annual Performance Plan 35–36 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/reports
-and-publications/budget-reports/secfy18congbudgjust [https://perma.cc/DQY2-KY
3A]; SEC, Fiscal Year 2017 Congressional Budget Justification & Annual Performance Plan 37–38 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy17congbudg
just.pdf [https://perma.cc/ARB3-296Z] [hereinafter SEC, 2017 APR]; SEC,
Fiscal Year 2014 Congressional Budget Justification & Annual Performance Plan
33 (2013), https://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy14congbudgjust.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PDW2-WJJC].
For further comparison, the data for the first metric (percentage of investigations yielding enforcement proceedings within 2 years) from FY 2003 and
FY 2004 were 63 percent and 69 percent, respectively, markedly higher than
the recent trend. SEC, 2004 Performance and Accountability Report 57, 59
(2005), https://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar04.pdf#sec2 [https://perma.cc
/MWK6-HJMP]. Data for the second metric, elapsed time to commencement of
enforcement action, were not published in the 2004 report.
29 See id.
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Not Met,” according to the Commission’s Annual Performance
Reviews covering 2012 through 2018.30
What is more, the published data do not cover the time it
takes for the Commission’s Staff to commence and close an investigation and notify an investigatee that no enforcement action
will be taken.31 This kind of delay has great importance to those
investigatees that stay under an enforcement cloud long after it
is apparent to the relevant staff and parties that no enforcement
case is in the offing.32 In response to an FOIA request by the author
for “the most recently available data showing, or sufficient to derive,
the average time it takes from the commencement of an investigation to the actual closing of an investigation,” the Commission’s
Office of FOIA Services has stated:
According to the Division of Enforcement, the average time it
takes from the commencement of an investigation to the actual closing of an investigation is 863 days. Please be advised
that if the enforcement matter originated as a matter under
inquiry (MUI) before it was administratively converted into
an investigation, this duration of time was included in the
calculation.33

See Fiscal Year 2020 Congressional Budget Justification Annual Performance Plan 123–24; Fiscal Year 2019 Congressional Budget Justification
Annual Performance Plan 109–10; Fiscal Year 2018 Congressional Budget
Justification Annual Performance Plan 35–36; Fiscal Year 2017 Congressional
Budget Justification & Annual Performance Plan 37–38; Fiscal Year 2014
Congressional Budget Justification & Annual Performance Plan 31, 33; see
also SEC, Fiscal Year 2016 Congressional Budget Justification & Annual Performance Plan 39–40 (2015); SEC, 2015 Fiscal Year Congressional Budget
Justification & Annual Performance Plan 147, 149 (2014).
31 Since 1972, the SEC has left to the Staff’s discretion whether to notify
investigatees that the investigation has been closed. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c)
(2008). According to the SEC Enforcement Division’s Manual, it is the Staff’s
“policy” to send termination letters to anyone that was named in the caption
of a formal order of investigation, made a Wells submission, asks for a letter,
or that reasonably believes the Staff was considering an enforcement recommendation against them. Nevertheless, the Staff, upon approval by a senior
Enforcement Division official, need not send a termination letter, and no
standards for such a decision are provided. SEC, Enforcement Manual 27–28
(2017), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf [https://
perma.cc/27GH-LQLQ].
32 See infra text accompanying notes 63–71.
33 Letter, SEC Office of FOIA Services to author, June 4, 2019 (in possession of author).
30
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In other words, the average investigation that does not result in
enforcement action lasts over two years and four months.
B.Recognition of the Problem over the Years
SEC investigations are non-public, and because the SEC,
generally, has had no interest in airing its dirty laundry,34 the
details of most instances of excessive delay are known only to
the SEC, investigatees and their counsel.35 Nevertheless, it has
been possible to locate through an intensive search on the Internet enough information to develop a reasonably reliable grasp
on the extent to which the issue has long been recognized, criticized, and analyzed, particularly from the vantage point of those
outside of the agency.36
“Although the SEC has previously conducted internal reviews of its enforcement activities, results have not always been made available to the
public.” Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from
Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679, 681 n.7 (2012) (citing
Judith Burns, SEC’s Enforcement Division Receives High Marks for Speedup
in Past Year, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1999, at B9). For example, the SEC conducted an internal review of its enforcement division in 1998, led by thenCommissioner Laura Unger, but the results were not made public. Id. It was
reported, however, that the review identified delays in bringing new cases
and completing existing ones. Id. And, several years later, in an interview,
Ms. Unger said that the study focused heavily on the time it took to complete
investigations. See infra text accompanying notes 51–53.
35 Occasionally, however, examples of excessive delay are documented in
reports of the SEC’s Office of Inspector General. See, e.g., Off. of Inspector
Gen., Failure to Timely Investigate Allegations of Financial Fraud at 16–17,
33–34 (detailing SEC Staff’s failure to investigate twenty complaints, over
thirty-three months, received from one registered representative (stockbroker)
concerning alleged fraud in sale of a public company’s assets, followed by Staff
decision not to investigate because the complaint was stale), https://www.sec
.gov/files/oig-505.pdf [http://perma.cc/FX3J-AEPZ]; see also SEC, Report of Investigation, Failure to Vigorously Enforce Action Against W. Holding and
Bear Stearns at the Miami Regional Office, Case No. OIG-483, 5, 24, 26
(2008) (detailing separate seven and eight-month delays where nothing occurred in investigation of Bear Stearns’ alleged fraudulent conduct, followed
by decision to close investigation even after settlement offer of $500,000),
http://pogoarchives.org/m/fo/sec-oig-report-20080930-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9
XA-9BSM].
36 See generally id.
34
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A 1956 memorandum from the Commission’s Division of
Corporation Finance highlighted the issue:
Don’t let cases drag. Keep close control over your cases and let
your superior know when a case is not proceeding properly,
either because of the conduct of the registrant or its representatives or because of internal problems here. Non-action on a
case or problem is the cause of most of the criticism we hear of
the Division and Commission with respect to matters within
our jurisdiction.37

In January 1972, Chairman William J. Casey, with the
concurrence of the other members of the SEC, appointed The
Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices (better
known by the last name of its Chairman, New York attorney John
A. Wells) “to review and evaluate the Commission’s enforcement
policies and practices,” and to make appropriate recommendations.38 The Committee issued a report in June 1972, with 43
37 Memorandum from Byron D. Whiteside on Division Operations and Operating Procedure to All Supervisory Personnel 2 (Sept. 4, 1956), http://3197
d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/col
lection/papers/1950/1956_0904_WoodsideOperationsT.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Q
MR-JP69] (emphasis added). This memorandum, although from the Division of
Corporation Finance, which has responsibility for processing and commenting
on SEC filings, such as registration statements, proxy statements, and periodic reports, is pertinent because through August 1972 the Commission’s enforcement responsibilities were carried out within each operating division,
such as “Corp Fin,” rather than being centralized in an Enforcement Division.
See generally SEC, ABOUT THE DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT, https://www.sec
.gov/enforce/Article/enforce-about.html [https://perma.cc/YL57-W4VB].
The Whiteside memorandum is one of thousands of documents preserved
on the website, http://www.sechistorical.org, of the SEC Historical Society, a
private, not-for-profit entity. I express my profound appreciation to its founders and supporters, who have had the foresight to collect and publish on its
website thousands of SEC documents—like the Whiteside memorandum—
that otherwise would be unavailable on the Internet.
38 John A. Wells et al., Report of the Advisory Committee on Enforcement
Policies and Practices 1 (1972), http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/papers
/1970/page-3.php (published in 3 parts in pdf format). The Report is referred
to in this Article as the “Wells Report.” Messrs. Cohen and Demmler were
former SEC Chairmen and private practitioners and Mr. Wells was a prominent corporate lawyer. On a point of personal privilege, I had the occasion to
face “Manny” Cohen across the table when he was in private practice and I
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recommendations.39 In September the Commission accepted the
most famous recommendation, no. 16 (calling for regularizing
practice of permitting potential respondents or defendants to make
a written submission)40 in substantial part.41 This led to the socalled “Wells Process,” which is specifically referred to in Exchange
Act section 4E(a)(1).42 For the purposes of this Article, however,
another recommendation, no. 11, is of more moment.
Aimed at various problems discussed in the Committee’s
Report, including investigations that were “too protracted”,43 this
recommendation was that:
[a] procedure should be established for auditing the investigative practices and techniques of enforcement personnel on a
continuing basis; to that end the Commission should designate
an official, who would perform a “staff” as distinguished from
a “line” function and be responsible directly to the Commission,
whose function would be, on a post-audit basis, to determine
whether the Commission’s policy of fairness, promptness, and
efficiency in investigative procedures is being observed.44

Significantly, among the “work assignments” suggested by the
Committee for this proposed official were “inquiries into the reasons for protracted investigations.”45 Nothing came of this particular recommendation—presumably, much to the relief of the
was with the SEC Enforcement Division in the 1970s. Manny was not only
the consummate gentleman, but he had a profound ability to find the “sweet
spot” to resolve an investigation—the point at which both the Staff and he
could justifiably conclude that a fair resolution had been achieved.
39 Id., passim. Each recommendation was stated in the introduction to the
Wells Report and was repeated—not necessarily word-for-word—and discussed
in the body of the report. Quoted recommendations herein are as stated in the
introduction to the Report.
40 Id., at iv, ¶ 16.
41 SEC, Procedures Relating to the Commencement of Enforcement Proceedings & Termination of Staff Investigations 1 (1972), https://www.sec.gov
/divisions/enforce/wells-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/GFG7-98AV] (codified at
17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c), part of the SEC’s Rules on Informal and Other Procedures).
None of the other recommendations was discussed in Release No. 5310.
42 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 4E(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1867 (2010).
43 Wells et al., supra note 38, at v, ¶¶ 22–23.
44 Id., at iii ¶ 11 (emphasis added).
45 Id. at 25.
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SEC Staff46—but the problem of too protracted investigations did
not disappear, and has remained unsolved to this day.47
In 1985, an American Bar Association task force recommended revisions to the SEC enforcement process, including
limiting SEC Orders of Investigation (the document authorizing
the conduct of a specific investigation and endowing the Staff
with subpoena power) to one year.48 This was an obvious reference to the troubling length of investigations. Nothing came of
this recommendation.49
In 1998, the SEC conducted an internal review of its enforcement division, led by then-Commissioner Laura Unger.50
Although the results were not made public, it was contemporaneously reported that the review identified delays in bringing
new cases and completing existing ones.51 According to an interview Ms. Unger gave years later, the review focused on Enforcement operations and, in particular, “why investigations take
too long; people not knowing when an investigation’s over, and
other resource issues.”52
At the beginning of the 21st Century, new Chairman Harvey
L. Pitt53 pressed for a policy of “real-time enforcement” to improve
It is apparent that the Staff opposed many of the Wells Committee recommendations. See Paul S. Atkins, Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission:
A Critical Review of the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program,
13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 381 (2008) (citing Harvey L. Pitt et al.,
SEC Enforcement Process, Internationalization of the Securities Markets—
Business Trends and Regulatory Policy, C489 ALI-ABA, 63 (1989)). While recommendation no. 11 was ignored by the Commission, the later creation of the
Office of Inspector General has resulted in the airing of Staff missteps by an
at least nominally neutral observer.
47 Id. See also Daniel Hawke, 5 Common Misconceptions About SEC Investigations, Law360 (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.arnoldporter.com/-/media/files
/perspectives/publications/2018/11/5-common-misconceptions-about-sec-inves
tigations.pdf [http://perma.cc/79D8-MZHA].
48 See Marc I. Steinberg, Emerging Capital Markets: Proposals and Recommendations for Implementation, 30 INT’L LAW. 715, 718, 720 (1996).
49 See generally id.
50 See Interview by Kenneth Durr with Laura Unger, SEC Historical Society, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 7, 2005), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c
016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/oral-histories/unger11
0705Transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LCU-KZA5] [hereinafter Unger Interview].
51 See Burns, supra note 34.
52 Unger Interview, supra note 50.
53 Few, if any, Chairmen, before or since, have brought to his or her tenure
the breadth of experience and detailed knowledge of the intricacies of this
46
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on a situation where “enforcement action often resulted many
years after actual wrongdoing had occurred, and often after the
fruits of such frauds had long been squandered.”54 A few highvisibility cases were brought very quickly, but, for the most part,
the Enforcement process continued to grind away, slowly.55
In 2007, the U.S. Governmental Accountability Office took
note that “Enforcement may leave open for years many investigations that are not being actively pursued with potentially
negative consequences for individuals and companies no longer
under review.”56 The GAO reported: “Enforcement officials cited
several reasons for division attorneys not always closing investigations promptly. In particular, the officials said that Enforcement attorneys may view pursing potential securities violations
as the division’s highest priority and lack sufficient time, administrative support, and incentives to comply with established administrative procedures for closing investigations.”57 The GAO
also took note of a new SEC Enforcement effort (as of June 2007)
to speed up case closings.58 There has been no discernible longterm improvement.59
Unreasonable delays even had a role in the SEC Staff’s
inability to discover, despite numerous examinations and enforcement inquiries, the Madoff fraud.60 In one such instance,
agency that Harvey Pitt brought. He had had an extremely successful career
in private practice, before which he had been SEC General Counsel, among
other leadership posts he held at the Commission. Since he left the SEC in
2003 he has continued his outstanding career in the private sector. Harvey L.
Pitt, SEC Historical Society, SEC Chairmen’s Roundtable Submission 4
(2004), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81
.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/2000/2004_0602_SECHS_RT_Ch_Pitt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2E4B-M2HK].
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-830, SEC: ADDITIONAL
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENSURE PLANNED IMPROVEMENTS ADDRESS LIMITATIONS
IN ENFORCEMENT DIVISION OPERATIONS 21 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets
/270/265419.pdf [https://perma.cc/HAN6-6J3Z].
57 Id.
58 Id. at 22.
59 See id.
60 See SEC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, OIG-509, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE
OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME 23, 29, 32 (2009),
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8AQ-GCVB].
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someone waited two weeks to open a MUI (matter under inquiry) for the latest Madoff enforcement inquiry, as a result of
which a tip from a suspicious former Madoff investor was not
followed up because the recipients of the tip did not know that
there was an active inquiry under way.61
C.The Causes and Effects of Excessive Delay
If it appears to be a commonly held opinion among attorneys things are too slow in the world of SEC enforcement, what
are the causes of excessive delay? Based on my forty-four years
of experience on both sides of the Enforcement table, it is too
easy an answer to say that SEC investigations are highly complex, manpower is limited, etc. The fact is that, based on my
experience, the bulk of SEC investigations are not exceptionally
complex and do not involve huge numbers of documents and witnesses, but, even if it were so, complexity is not likely the prime
or even a significant cause of excessive delay.
In any one investigation, the active conduct of the investigation (subpoenaing and reviewing documents and taking sworn
testimony of witnesses) often takes substantially less time than the
processing of the Staff’s recommendations to either take enforcement action or close the investigation without action. Substantial amounts of time typically pass after the Staff has finished
the active investigation, after which time is taken up, typically,
by the Staff’s providing Wells notifications and receiving Wells
submissions; by the drafting of an “action memorandum” recommending an enforcement action (or, in the alternative, a closing memorandum); by the review of such memoranda at various
levels of the Division of Enforcement; and by the Staff’s sending
an action memorandum to other interested divisions or offices
within the SEC for their review and comment. (Of course, for the
purposes of section 4E, the only time period that counts is measured
from the date of a written Wells notification or the period of any
extension.) These reviews are important and vital processes,62
Id. at 262–68.
The review process is a vital part of a fair and effective SEC enforcement
program, but, for cases that are actually litigated, it is not at all uncommon for
the SEC to be unable to prove at trial what it alleged in its complaint despite
its ability to obtain sworn pre-filing testimony from all possible witnesses.
61
62
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which, if performed with dispatch and care, certainly do not excessively delay the enforcement process, and are designed to lead to
fair results. While precise measurements are not possible on the
basis of publicly available data, experience suggests that there
are other significant pockets of delay, including investigatees’ “slowwalking” production of documents and Staff disinterestedness.
For his part, Professor Vollmer suggests that “[t]he main
reason for prolonged investigations, especially since the Madoff
affair, is the staff’s reluctance to close an investigation because
See, e.g., SEC v. Schvacho, 991 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1301 (N.D. Ga. 2014), in
which, after a bench trial, the court entered judgment for the defendant,
noting “the overreaching, self-serving interpretation that the SEC imposed on
the evidence presented at trial.”
A reasonable inference from a failure to prove what is alleged is that what
was alleged was not actually supported by the investigative record. Unfortunately, such a situation is far from unheard of at the SEC. See Andrew N.
Vollmer, Four Ways to Improve SEC Enforcement, 43 SEC. REG. L.J. 1 (2015)
(“[One of t]he three fundamental problems with SEC enforcement [is] that
the Commission and the Division of Enforcement misunderstand or mischaracterize the factual record”). This stems from either the lack of, or inadequate,
supervisory review of the actual basis for factual assertions in a Staff action
memorandum. Professor Vollmer is a former SEC Deputy General Counsel
and an experienced SEC practitioner in private practice, and his article is a
valuable and insightful overview of what is wrong with SEC enforcement.
Notably, his article also focuses on the need to shorten SEC investigations:
Extended investigations disserve the enforcement process and
the persons being investigated. The delays increase the costs
of defense and the burdens on private parties. Lengthy investigations create uncertainty for both companies and individuals,
and uncertainty about the SEC's plans can harm reputations,
stall careers, and postpone financings and investments, research,
and product development.
Id. In the author’s experience, it is not at all rare for the Staff members conducting the investigation to misstate the evidence (not necessarily in bad
faith—sometimes, instead, through inattention) in advancing a case towards
Commission consideration. The solution is simple: careful review of underlying evidence by supervisory staff members. It is unclear, however, how intensive such review is, if it occurs at all. See Richard E. Brodsky, Commentary:
Report inadvertently opens window into SEC’s operations, MIAMI DAILY BUS.
REV. (2008) (“Staff investigators’ reports on the results of investigations are
often not reviewed carefully to make sure that the facts are as they are portrayed or supported by sufficient evidence, with the result that critical decisions affecting people’s lives can be made on the basis of mistaken, or even
false, assumptions or inadequate evidence”).
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of a fear of overlooking a serious issue or of being criticized for
failing to enforce the securities laws vigorously.”63 That may be
the case since the Madoff fraud exploded in December 2008, but
the problem of excessive delay plagued the Commission for decades before then, so unless fear of missing things has been the
main problem all along, it is not realistic to view it as the “main”
cause today.64 Ultimately, excessive delay is a management problem.65 Until career success at the management level is no longer
defined by the simple metric of the number of cases a staff attorney’s work has resulted in an enforcement action being brought, it
will continue to defy solution.66
Whatever its causes, the adverse effects of excessive delay
are real.67 Excessive delay harms investigatees when the SEC
Staff leaves an investigation open long after it should be obvious
that an enforcement action is not a realistic outcome.68 As observed by the 1972 Wells Committee, “investigations are often
protracted and their existence frequently becomes a matter of public
knowledge. During the pendency of an investigation uncertainties are likely to be created in the minds of the investigatees and
those with whom they have business or other dealings.”69 One
court, although ruling that section 4E did not act as a limitations provision, nevertheless recognized that, “[i]n enacting the
deadline, Congress obviously recognized the seriousness of a
long-pending unresolved SEC investigation, a concern that would
be exacerbated where the targets might include a public company
Vollmer, supra note 62.
Id. at 7.
65 Id. at 5.
66 Id. at 6.
67 Professor Vollmer regards the need to shorten investigations as one of
the four basic problems with SEC enforcement:
Extended investigations disserve the enforcement process and
the persons being investigated. The delays increase the costs
of defense and the burdens on private parties. Lengthy investigations create uncertainty for both companies and individuals,
and uncertainty about the SEC’s plans can harm reputations,
stall careers, and postpone financings and investments, research,
and product development.
Vollmer, supra note 62, at 7.
68 Id. at 7.
69 Wells et al., supra note 38, at 20.
63
64
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or its officers and directors subject to disclosure requirements.”70
Thus, many public companies will disclose receipt of a Wells
notification,71 and, depending on the specific information requested,
broker-dealers and investment and municipal advisors may be
required to disclose pending investigations in response to a request for proposal (RFP) from a municipal entity or other potential issuer.72 Finally, if a case sits long enough on SEC desks,
virtual or real, there can develop intense pressure on the part of
a party under investigation to agree to settle the case just to be free
of its overhang.73 In sum, the longer a case destined for closure
remains open, the greater the damage done to those investigatees
that, in the end, will not be named in an enforcement action.
The adverse effects of excessive delay are also felt by the
Commission and the public in the depreciation of the deterrent
effect of prompt enforcement action—the SEC publicly states
that “[w]hile timeliness in filing actions can be influenced by a
number of factors, it is important because it can enhance the
action’s deterrent impact”74—as well as uninformed markets having to trade on misinformation not uncovered by prompt exposure by the SEC.75 In addition, when excessive delay occurs,
SEC v. NIR Grp., LLC, No. CV 11-4723 JFB GRB, 2013 WL 5288962, at
*5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2013).
71 Deborah S. Birnbach, Do You Have to Disclose a Government Investigation?, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial
Regulation (Apr. 9, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/04/09/do-you
-have-to-disclose-a-government-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/VNN4-YB9W].
72 E.g., Chicago, Ill. Park District, Request for Proposal (RFP) for Independent Registered Municipal Advisor (IRMA) Services 13 (Apr. 30, 2018),
https://assets.chicagoparkdistrict.com/s3fs-public/documents/page/Request%20
For%20Prposal%20-RFP-%20for%20Independent%20Registered%20Municipal
%20Advisor%20-IRMA-%20Services%20%204.30.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/EMW3
-MG5Q] (“List any pending investigation of the firm or enforcement or disciplinary action, administrative proceeding, malpractice claim or other like proceeding by the SEC, MSRB or other federal, state or local regulatory body
against your firm or any of its personnel relating to your firm’s services as
financial advisor current, pending, or occurring in the past three (3) years.”).
73 Vollmer, supra note 62, at 3.
74 E.g., SEC, 2017 APR, supra note 28, at 109.
75 The negative effect on the deterrent value of taking too long to bring an
enforcement action was one of the cornerstones of SEC Chairman Pitt’s “realtime enforcement” initiative. See Pitt, supra note 53, at 4.
70
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cases get stale, memories fade, and justice suffers, so both sides
in an adjudicated case can suffer from the effects of delay.76
II.THE MONTFORD DECISIONS
Congress enacted section 4A into law in 2010,77 but it has
been treated both by the Commission and the courts as an essentially meaningless law.78 The key decision is Montford. In this
section, I analyze the decision, starting with the Initial Decision
of the SEC Administrative Law Judge, proceeding to the Commission’s Opinion, and, finally, the decision of the D.C. Circuit. I
find substantial issues with which to disagree at all three levels.
A.Proceedings at the SEC
Montford involved a registered investment adviser that
allegedly misled its clients into believing that it was wholly independent when, in fact, it received kickbacks from an institution with which it urged its clients to invest.79 The Commission
instituted an administrative enforcement proceeding, under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940,80 187 days after the Staff provided a Wells notification to the adviser and its principal.81 After
an evidentiary hearing, the SEC administrative law judge (ALJ)
found the adviser and its principal liable for fraud and other
violations and imposed penalties and other sanctions, which
findings were affirmed by the Commission and the D.C. Circuit.82 The respondents raised a defense that the proceeding was
barred because the Staff missed the deadline under section 4E
and the deadline was not properly extended, and separately
moved to dismiss on the same grounds.83 The ALJ rejected these
Vollmer, supra note 62, at 8.
SEC, The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, https://www.sec
.gov/answers/about-laws.html [https://perma.cc/DJQ8-AU9R].
78 Vollmer, supra note 62, at 7.
79 In re Montford & Co. (Montford/SEC), Investment Advisors Act Release
No. 3829, 108 SEC Docket 3763, 3779 (May 2, 2014), affirming In re Montford & Co. (Montford/ALJ), Admin. Proc. No. 3-14536, 2012 WL 1377372
(Apr. 20, 2012).
80 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1ff (2005).
81 Montford & Co. v. SEC, 793 F.3d 76, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
82 Id.
83 Id.
76
77
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defenses.84 She found that the Enforcement Director had extended
the 180-day deadline, and—according to the Commission’s order
denying the respondents’ request for an interlocutory order—
“implicitly found” that, in doing so, the Director had made the
requisite “complexity determination.”85
On appeal from the initial decision, the SEC affirmed.86
Regarding the alleged violation of section 4E, the SEC affirmed
on different grounds than advanced by the ALJ.87 Obviously eager
to rule on the underlying issue of the effect of missing the deadline, the Commission largely ignored that issue88 and focused
almost entirely on its view that section 4E imposed no limitations period. A summary of the SEC’s main points is as follows:
Section 4E was enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, a statute that significantly expanded the Commission’s authority to
police fraud in the securities industry. This particular provision was included under the section of the Dodd-Frank Act titled “Increasing Regulatory Enforcement and Remedies,”
which Congress explained at the time “strengthens the SEC’s
authority to conduct investigations.” Nowhere in Section 4E,
or elsewhere in the Act, did Congress identify a consequence if
Commission staff fails to comply with these deadlines. Section
4E states in pertinent part only that, 180 days after providing
a Wells notification, Division “staff shall either file ... or provide
notice to the Director of the Division ... of its intent to not file
an action.” Section 4E says nothing about dismissal or preclusion of action if the deadline is missed; nor does it expressly
afford the recipients of a Wells notification any rights.89

The Commission expanded its “statutory purpose” argument, stating that “[t]he only statute of limitations applicable to
Id.
Montford & Co., Order Denying Suggestion for Interlocutory Review,
Advisers Act Rel. No. 3311, at 2 (Nov. 9, 2011).
86 Montford, 793 F.3d at 80.
87 Id.
88 The Commission found no error in the ALJ’s finding that the Staff
properly extended the 180-day deadline, but pointedly emphasized that “the
basis for [the extension] is irrelevant to any claim or defense that Respondents
can make here.” In re Montford & Co. (Montford/SEC), Investment Advisors
Act Release No. 3829, 108 SEC Docket 3763, 3771 (May 2, 2014), affirming In
re Montford & Co. (Montford/ALJ), Admin. Proc. No. 3-14536, 2012 WL
1377372 (Apr. 20, 2012) (footnotes omitted).
89 Id.
84
85
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our proceedings is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2462,” and that “[i]n
enacting section 4E, Congress said nothing about creating a new
abbreviated statute of limitations, either as a replacement for or
a supplement to 28 U.S.C. § 2462.”90 It added:
Moreover, it would be inconsistent with Congress’s intent to increase our authority to curb securities fraud under the DoddFrank Act section enacting Section 4E to read the provision as
limiting our ability to act in a proceeding that otherwise meets
the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2462. This is particularly true
where, as here, dismissal of the action would harm the investing
public by foreclosing the Commission from taking appropriate
remedial measures.91

The SEC also reasoned that, given that the Staff has the
discretion, according to the SEC’s rules and judicial precedent,
whether or not to provide a Wells notification, “[i]t would make
little sense to conclude that the remedy for missing the 180-day
deadline is dismissal when the Division could avoid this outcome
by not issuing a Wells notification in the first place.”92
The Commission stated that its “interpretation” of section
4E was consistent with pertinent Supreme Court precedent, citing
Brock v. Pierce County93 and United States v. James Daniel Good
Real Property94 Both of these cases dealt with the meaning of
statutes “prescrib[ing] internal time periods for federal agency
action without specifying any consequences for noncompliance.”95
The Commission—incorrectly, in my view96—read both cases as
having “held that congressional enactments that prescribe internal
time periods for federal agency action without specifying any consequences for noncompliance do not necessitate dismissal of the
action if the agency does not act within the time prescribed.”97
Finally, the Commission concluded:
Based on the text and legislative history of Section 4E and
Supreme Court precedent interpreting similar statutes, we
Id.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
92 Id. at 3772.
93 476 U.S. 253 (1986).
94 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
95 Montford/SEC, 108 SEC Docket at 3771.
96 See infra text accompanying notes 143–66.
97 Montford/SEC, 108 SEC Docket at 3771–72.
90
91
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find that this provision is intended to operate as an internal
timing directive, designed to compel our staff to complete investigations, examinations, and inspections in a timely manner
and not as a statute of limitations.98

B.The D.C. Circuit Opinion
1.Chevron
The respondents appealed to the D.C. Circuit, which, in
reliance on Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,99 affirmed.100 To evaluate the D.C. Circuit’s Montford
decision, however, one must engage in a slight detour: while a full
analysis of Chevron and its progeny is well beyond the scope of this
Article, there must be a review of at least the Chevron basics.101
Chevron involved a challenge by a public interest group to
the validity of the Environmental Protection Agency’s rules,
enacted under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, covering
the regulation of “new or modified major stationary sources” of
air pollution by states that had not attained air quality standards
previously established by EPA.102 In its rules, EPA permitted
those “non-attaining” states to allow individual plants to use the
“bubble” approach—to group all individual new or modified “stationary sources” together, so that any one “source” could be in
non-compliance so long as overall plant emissions did not exceed
the standard.103 The D.C. Circuit found that the term “stationary sources” was not “explicitly defined” in the statute and that
the legislative history was “contradictory,”104 so the court turned
to “the purposes of the non-attainment program.”105 The court
held that EPA’s use of the “bubble concept” in this regulation
conflicted with earlier decisions of that Circuit holding that this
Id. at 3772.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
100 793 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
101 467 U.S. at 837.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 839–40.
104 Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir.
1982), rev’d sub nom. Chevron, USA., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
105 Id. at 723 n.39.
98
99
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concept was inapplicable to situations in which Congress intended
to improve air quality and not just preserve the status quo.106
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, stated that “[t]he basic
legal error of the Court of Appeals was to adopt a static judicial definition of the term ‘stationary source’ when it had decided that
Congress itself had not commanded that definition.”107 He then
proceeded to explain how the Court of Appeals should have decided the case:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions.
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction
on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.108

The Court further explained in a now-famous footnote:
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which
are contrary to clear congressional intent. If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that
Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that
intention is the law and must be given effect.109

Id. at 726.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
108 Id. at 842–43 (footnotes omitted). This is what is now called the Chevron
“two-step analysis.” E.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117,
2124 (2016) (applying Chevron to Department of Labor regulation establishing
scope of exemption from overtime provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act).
Or, as some refer to it, the “Chevron Two-Step.” See Catherine M. Sharkey,
Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2361 (2018);
Jacob Crump, Corpus Linguistics in the Chevron Two-Step, 2018 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 399, 418 (2018). Not hailing from Texas and never having learned to
dance the two-step, I refer to the Chevron Two-Step as “the Two Questions,”
Step One as “Question 1,” and Step Two as “Question 2.”
109 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied).
106
107
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Despite the seeming clarity and simplicity of the Chevron
opinion, the development of the law in the years since has led to
extraordinary confusion and uncertainty concerning its meaning
and application, with many Supreme Court opinions seemingly
in conflict with one another.110 There is reasonable doubt even
as to whether the standard of review that seems to have been
mandated by Chevron differs in any material respect from that
applied in traditional judicial review of agency decisions.111 Thus,
under the Administrative Procedures Act, a reviewing court is to
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law”.112 This is the same standard that the
Court has said is to be applied to Chevron Question 2,113 leading
Justice Kagan to state that the analysis under Chevron Question 2
and the APA “would be the same.”114
Rather than join the fray about what Chevron “really”
means or requires, I return to the Court’s opinion for the bedrock
of its analysis. Chevron lays out certain “well-settled principles,”
the avoidance of which it says caused “the Court of Appeals [to
have] misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the regulations at issue.”115 One can only wonder why so many serious
There is a plethora of scholarly articles discussing the problem of making
intelligible sense of Chevron and its progeny. Professor Michael Kagan has noted:
Since the early days of the doctrine, the trouble with Chevron
has been in understanding why the Court does one thing in one
case but another thing in another case. The problem is not just
that the Court has sometimes explicitly indicated that there are
exceptions to this doctrine—the so-called ‘Step Zero,’ for example. Instead, the problem is that the Court far more frequently fails to follow Chevron’s normal two-step analysis in cases
to which it seems to apply and then does not explain why.
Michael Kagan, Loud and Soft Anti-Chevron Decisions, 53 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 37, 39 (2018).
111 Vollmer, supra note 62, at 3.
112 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012).
113 See, e.g., Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541, 558 (2012) (deferring under Question 2 because agency regulations were “neither arbitrary
or capricious in substance, [n]or manifestly contrary to the statute”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
114 See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011) (“analysis” under
section 706(2) and Chevron Question 2 “would be the same”).
115 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
110

348 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:323
analyses of Chevron do not start with, or even review, these
“principles.”116 Only one Supreme Court decision, INS v. CardozaFonseca, does so.117
The Chevron “principles,” in full, are as follows:
The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created ... program necessarily requires the formulation
of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly
or explicitly, by Congress.’ If Congress has explicitly left a gap
for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority
to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation
to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than
explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.
We have long recognized that considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of
deference to administrative interpretations
“has been consistently followed by this Court whenever
decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has
involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the
given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to
agency regulations.”
....
“If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation
of conflicting policies that were committed to the
agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it
unless it appears from the statute or its legislative
history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.”118
Id.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987) (Chevron is not applicable where a case involves a “pure question of statutory construction for
the courts to decide.”). For a discussion of Cardoza-Fonseca, see Andrew N.
Vollmer, SEC Revanchism and the Expansion of Primary Liability Under
Section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5, 10 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 273, 327–28 (2016).
118 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–45 (citations and footnotes omitted).
116
117
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The Court concluded:
In light of these well-settled principles it is clear that the
Court of Appeals misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the regulations at issue. Once it determined, after its own
examination of the legislation, that Congress did not actually
have an intent regarding the applicability of the bubble concept to the permit program, the question before it was not
whether in its view the concept is ‘inappropriate’ in the general context of a program designed to improve air quality, but
whether the Administrator’s view that it is appropriate in the
context of this particular program is a reasonable one.119

In summary, based on the Court’s recitation of these
“well-settled principles,” and assuming that it makes a difference whether Chevron is found to apply to a particular statutory
provision, Chevron applies when Congress (i) enacts a statute
addressing or establishing a policy arising under the statutory
regime entrusted to its administration by an agency possessed of
the expertise to establish that policy, but (ii) does not set precise
standards for determination of the policy. Under such circumstances, a court could reasonably conclude that Congress impliedly
intended to delegate that policy decision to the agency.120
Id. at 845.
At the time of this Article, it is unclear whether the law concerning judicial deference to administrative interpretations of statutes is headed for a
major change. See generally Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), in which
Justice Gorsuch, in a concurring opinion in a case on judicial deference to an
administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, in a passage in
which he was joined by Justice Thomas:
To be sure, under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d
694 (1984), we sometimes defer to an agency’s construction of
a statute. But there are serious questions, too, about whether
that doctrine comports with the APA and the Constitution.
See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120–2121 (2018)
(KENNEDY, J., concurring); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct.
2699, 2713–2714 (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring); Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct, 1199, 1211–1213 (SCALIA, J.,
concurring in judgment)
(citations omitted). Id. at 2446 n.114. Given the uncertainty of the future of
Chevron, even absent the undeniable uncertainty about what it means and
how it is to be applied, I assume in this Article that Chevron will not be reversed or materially limited or expanded.
119
120
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2.The D.C. Circuit’s Montford Opinion
The D.C. Circuit held that “Section 4E is ambiguous”121 and
that “the Commission’s interpretation of Section 4E, as not imposing a jurisdictional bar, is reasonable and entitled to deference.”122
“We thus do not need to address the Commission’s alternative
argument that it had properly extended the deadline.”123
The court’s rationale for finding ambiguity was that Congress, by not specifying any consequence for the Commission’s
failure to bring an enforcement action within 180 days after
issuing a Wells notification, had not “directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”124 The court rejected the respondents’
arguments “that Section 4E’s ‘language, structure, purpose, and
legislative history all establish that the deadline is mandatory
and jurisdictional,’”125 finding instead that “[w]hile these arguments demonstrate that it might be reasonable to interpret Section 4E as having a jurisdictional consequence, these arguments
do not show that the statute forecloses other interpretations.”126
Since it concluded the “statute is silent ... with respect to
the specific issue,” the court turned to “whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”127
In answering this question, the court made no mention of any
issue discussed in the Commission’s Opinion other than its interpretation of two Supreme Court opinions concerning agency
deadlines, Brock and James Daniel Good128 [hereinafter Good].129
The court found that both cases held that statutory deadlines
failing to prescribe a consequence for an agency’s missing them
did not foreclose subsequent action, which the court found to be
the case here.130 The court concluded: “Nothing in the text or
Montford & Co. v. SEC, 793 F.3d 76, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Id. at 81.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 82.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 63 (1993)
129 Id. at 82–83.
130 Id. at 83. The court also cited a case decided after the Commission’s
Opinion, United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 411–14 (2015), which
the Montford court said “reminded us ... [that] time limitations for filings in
statutes are presumptively non-jurisdictional.” Id. Kwai involved claims by
121
122
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structure of Section 4E overcomes the strong presumption that,
where Congress has not stated that an internal deadline shall act
as a statute of limitations, courts will not infer such a result.”131
III.A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF MONTFORD
My overall evaluation of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in
Montford is that it appeared to address the issue before it in an
overly mechanistic manner and failed to grasp the key underlying issue of whether summarily deferring to the Commission’s
interpretation of section 4E was a commonsensical approach.
First, the court paid no apparent mind to the question of
whether Chevron even applied.132 If, as it appears, Chevron applies where Congress has enacted a statute that addresses, but does
not set precise standards on, a question of policy arising under a
statutory regime entrusted to an agency possessed of the expertise to establish that policy, then the Montford court erred by
applying Chevron. The answer to this question can be found in
looking closely at the nature of the issue before the court.
The issue in Chevron—whether non-attainment states
should be permitted to regulate new stationary sources by
grouping these individual sources on a plant-wide basis—is the
quintessential policy question.133 And agency personnel, who
make such decisions on a day-to-day basis, are obviously more
qualified than a federal judge, by reason of experience, training,
and role, to make that decision.134 It is thus very reasonable to
believe that Congress, while not saying so, intended that the
EPA, not the federal court, be the primary maker of that choice
(subject to the constraints that the agency’s policy decision is not
inconsistent with the statute and is “reasonable.”)135
By contrast to Chevron and the Clean Air Act, what Congress meant when it enacted section 4E of the Exchange Act
private parties against the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
which established two deadlines to enable a plaintiff to sue. Finding that the
deadlines were not “jurisdictional,” i.e., they did not act to “deprive[ ] a court
of all authority to hear a case,” 575 U.S. at 408–09, the Court held that they
were subject to equitable tolling. Id. at 419–20.
131 Montford, 793 F.3d at 83.
132 Id. 81–82.
133 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
134 Id. at 865–66.
135 Id.
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does not invite a “policy” choice at all; it is a matter of seeking
its meaning by employing “traditional tools of statutory construction.”136 It would be different, for example, if the case concerned the SEC’s enactment of a rule defining a particular sort
of securities transaction as a “manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance” under the Exchange Act.137 In such a case, the
Commission can be assumed to have the expertise and experience, based on its overseeing the securities markets, to decide
whether that sort of transaction is inherently manipulative or
deceptive and merits being outlawed by one of its rules.138
But it requires no citation to establish that the SEC, no
more than any other administrative agency, possesses no special
expertise to determine the meaning of a statute, such as section 4E,
that does not require any special substantive experience to supply
the answer. It is true that the agency might have views on the
subject, but so would an industry group or the citizenry at large.
Additionally, it is important that the agency’s views, by definition, are subject to being influenced by the agency’s self-interest in
expanding its authority or contracting the limits on its discretion.139 This very real possibility makes the agency’s views less
compelling.140 Moreover, from the beginning of the republic, courts
Id. at 843 n.9.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
138 See Vernazza v. SEC, 327 F.3d 851, 869 (9th Cir. 2003) (deferring to
SEC under Chevron, citing the SEC’s expertise).
139 Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 233 (2006).
140 “[W]hen an agency’s self-interest is so conspicuously at stake, Congress
should not be taken to have implicitly delegated law-interpreting power to
the agency.” Id. at 209–10. A corollary to the concern about deferring to an
agency when its own authority is at stake is a concern about deferring to an
agency position when, as in Montford, the position was first announced in a
litigation context. See Bradley George Hubbard, Deference to Agency Statutory
Interpretations First Advanced in Litigation? The Chevron Two-Step and the
Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 452–58 (2013) (discussing different
circuits’ decisions on whether agency interpretations announced in litigation
merit deference under Skidmore); Sarah Zeleznikow, “Leaving the Fox in Charge
of the Hen House”: Of Agencies, Jurisdictional Determinations and the Separation of Powers, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 275, 304–11 (2016) (discussing
agency bias and self-interest within an agency and the questionable nature of
the Chevron Doctrine); see also E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Smiley,
138 S. Ct. 2563, 2563 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(citing Hubbard, supra, arguing for granting of certiorari to resolve circuit
split on whether “an agency [can] advance an interpretation of a statute for
the first time in litigation and then demand deference for its view”).
136
137
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have been vested with the authority to say what the law is.141 Thus,
it is more than reasonable to assert that following the “well-settled
principles” underlying Chevron, the Montford court should have
concluded that Chevron did not apply, and the court would owe
the SEC’s reading of section 4E such deference as it deemed
appropriate, which would not appear to be particularly great.
Second, let’s assume that I am wrong that Chevron does not
apply. Did the Montford court appear to have answered question
one correctly? The question, according to Chevron, is “whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” or
whether section 4E is, in another Chevron formulation of question one, “ambiguous.”142
The Montford court’s analysis was limited to the simple
holding that “[b]y not specifying any consequence for the Commission’s failure to bring an enforcement action within 180 days
after issuing a Wells notification, Congress has not ‘directly spoken
to the precise question at issue.’”143 Curiously, the court cited no
authority in support of this answer to Question one.144 Therefore, if this holding—that the only question is whether Congress
explicitly spelled out the consequences of the agency’s missing a
statutory deadline—is wrong as a matter of law, then the justifiability of the D.C. Circuit’s and the SEC’s reliance on Brock
(and on this supposed rule) disappears.
We are not left in the dark as to where Montford was
looking when it proclaimed this simple test to be the law, for, in
answering Question two, Montford, it found “[t]he Commission’s
analysis of Supreme Court precedent, and its application of that
precedent to Section 4E, is sound.”145 Specifically, the court noted
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”). The
issue of whether Chevron conflicts with Marbury and the vesting of judicial
authority in Article III courts has been raised in numerous cases and commentaries. See Aditya Bamzai, Marbury v. Madison and the Concept of Judicial Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1057, 1057–58 (2016) (analyzing “seeming tension”
between Chevron and Marbury).
142 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984).
143 Montford and Co. v. SEC, 793 F.3d 76, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
144 Id.
145 Montford, 793 F.3d at 83.
141
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that the Commission had “discussed” Brock and Good.146 The court
characterized the holdings in those two cases in the same manner
as the SEC had in its Opinion:
In Brock, the Court held that the Secretary of Labor’s failure
to act by a 120-day deadline did not foreclose subsequent action, where the statute did not identify a consequence for
missing the deadline. ... In Good, the Court held that when “a
statute does not specify a consequence for noncompliance with
statutory timing provisions, the federal courts will not in the
ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction.”147

However, the unavoidable truth is that the Montford court
and the SEC plainly misstated the holding in Brock, as did the
Supreme Court itself in Good. In Brock, a statute required the
Secretary of Labor to issue a “final determination” of whether a
grant recipient had misused job-training funds within 120 days
of receiving a complaint.148 The Secretary missed the deadline
but proceeded to seek to recover misused funds.149 The question
was whether the Secretary’s failure to act within that period
caused him to lose the power to recover misused funds.150
While the exact holding in Brock is muddled,151 one thing
is absolutely clear: The Brock Court expressly stated that “[w]e
Id. at 82–83.
Id. at 83 (citations omitted).
148 Brock v. Pierce Cty., 476 U.S. 253, 254–55 (1986).
149 Id. at 256–57.
150 Id. at 253.
151 Three possible holdings are suggested in Brock:
(1) “We hold that CETA’s requirement that the Secretary ‘shall’
take action within 120 days does not, standing alone, divest
the Secretary of jurisdiction to act after that time. There
is simply no indication in the statute or its legislative history that Congress intended to remove the Secretary’s enforcement powers if he fails to issue a final determination on
a complaint or audit within 120 days.” Id. at 266.
(2) “We would be most reluctant to conclude that every failure
of an agency to observe a procedural requirement voids subsequent agency action, especially when important public
rights are at stake. When, as here, there are less drastic remedies available for failure to meet a statutory deadline, courts
should not assume that Congress intended the agency to
lose its power to act.” Id. at 260 (footnote omitted).
146
147
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need not, and do not, hold that a statutory deadline for agency
action can never bar later action unless that consequence is stated
explicitly in the statute.”152 How much more clearly could a court
state what its holding was not? Since both the Montford court
and the Commission—not to mention the Supreme Court in
Good153—got Brock wrong, it becomes necessary to see if section
4E of the Exchange Act can be meaningfully distinguished from
the statute analyzed in Brock. There are in fact, many distinctions between the two statutes.154
In Brock, the Court found that the “complainant” whose
complaint was not acted on within the 120-day statutory period
would have standing to bring an action in federal court to compel agency action.155 Also,
[i]f respondent is correct in arguing that Congress, in enacting
[the applicable statute] intended to protect grant recipients
from lengthy delays in audits, grant recipients such as respondent would be within the zone of interests protected by
[the statute], and would therefore have standing to bring an
action under the APA to the same extent as a complainant.156
(3) “[Even under respondent’s theory, § 106(b) cannot be jurisdictional, because it would then permit the Secretary’s inaction to prejudice individual complainants seeking to enforce
their rights under CETA. We hold, therefore, that the mere
use of the word ‘shall’ in § 106(b), standing alone, is not
enough to remove the Secretary’s power to act after 120
days.” Id. at 262.
To avoid getting caught in the thicket of deciding exactly what the holding of
Brock is, I consider both statements discussed in the text to be its holdings.
See United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924) (where
there are two grounds, upon either of which an appellate court may rest its
decision, and it adopts both, the ruling on neither is obiter, but each is the
judgment of the court, and of equal validity with the other) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). For an extensive discussion of how to
identify the holding in a case, see Stephen E. Ryan, Guns and Dictum: Is the
Fifth Circuit’s Finding of an Individual Right under the Second Amendment
Dictum or Holding, 81 N.C. L. REV. 853, 856, 858 (2003) (describing “prescriptive” and “descriptive” techniques of deriving ratio decidendi, or holding, of
case; citing Title Ins. as using “prescriptive” technique).
152 Brock, 476 U.S. at 262 n.9 (emphasis added).
153 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 63 (1993).
154 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 4E(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1867 (2010).
155 Brock, 476 U.S at 260 n.7.
156 Id.
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No such comparable provision is contained in the Exchange
Act, nor has it ever been suggested that any such procedures can
be inferred to be available, in part because the typical SEC investigation does not contain the neat categories of complainant
and grant recipients. Even if an investigatee could sue to compel
the Commission to decide whether to sue or drop the case it would
seem unrealistic, if not utterly foolhardy, for an investigatee to
do so since the likely reaction of the SEC would be to jump off
the fence and institute an enforcement action.
Another distinction is that, in Brock, the statute did more
than require the Secretary to file an action; it required the Secretary to resolve the entire dispute within the 120-day period.157
“This is a more substantial task than filing a complaint, and the
Secretary’s ability to complete it within 120 days is subject to
factors beyond his control.”158 There is less reason, therefore, to
believe that Congress intended such drastic consequences to follow
from the Secretary’s failure to meet the 120-day deadline.159 By
contrast, in the case of section 4E, all that is required is that the
Commission file an action or decide to close the case within 180
days of the Staff’s providing a written Wells notification which
by definition is not done until nearly the end of the investigative
process; moreover, the deadline can be extended.160
The Brock Court found direct support for its holding in
the statute’s legislative history.161 Specifically in Brock, there
was a floor colloquy in which the sponsor of an amendment containing the deadline expressly agreed that a failure to meet the
deadline would “not affect the Secretary’s jurisdiction in the
matter.”162 The Court found the colloquy was not “controlling”
but, because it was consistent with the statutory language and
other legislative history, they found it to “provide evidence of
Congress’ intent.”163 The Court also found that the statute of
which the 120-day period was a part was aimed at “the growing
incidence of fraud and misuse of CETA funds by state and local
Id. at 266.
Id. at 261.
159 Id.
160 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5(a)(2) (2012).
161 Brock, 476 U.S. at 264–65.
162 Id. at 263.
163 Id.
157
158
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governments,” and that “[a] primary purpose of the [statute] was
to strengthen the Secretary’s hand in dealing with illegal practices.”164 By contrast, there is nothing in the legislative history
of Dodd-Frank, as it directly pertains to section 4E, that supports the Montford holding.165 In fact, a fair reading of the legislative history stands in stark contrast with the reading given the
legislative history by both the SEC and the Montford court.166
Good held that the Government violated due process in a
civil forfeiture case by seizing real property without giving the
owner notice and an opportunity to be heard.167 To the point
here, Good also held that a court could not dismiss a forfeiture
action filed within the statute of limitations when government
officials failed to comply with “a series of internal notification
and reporting requirements,” including two “reporting up” requirements and a mandate that a forfeiture action must be
“immediately” and “forthwith” brought if the Attorney General
believes one is warranted.168
The Court based that conclusion on its reading of two previous Supreme Court decisions, Brock and United States v. MontalvoMurillo,169 which the Good Court characterized has having “held
that if a statute does not specify a consequence for noncompliance
with statutory timing provisions, the federal courts will not in the
ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction.”170 As we have
already noted, that was not the holding in Brock and it is a stretch
to say that Montalvo-Murillo conforms to this categorization.171
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 stated that a “judicial officer
shall hold a hearing” to determine whether to grant bail to an
arrested person and that “hearing shall be held immediately
Id.
See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial
Protection Act: A Brief Legislative History with Links, Reports, and Summaries,
LAW LIBRARIANS SOC’Y OF WASH., D.C., http://www.llsdc.org/dodd-frank-legis
lative-history [https://perma.cc/M9Y7-BVQU].
166 See infra text accompanying notes 174–211.
167 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993).
168 Id. at 48 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
169 495 U.S. 711 (1990).
170 Good, 510 U.S. at 63.
171 Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. at 717–21.
164
165

358 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:323
upon the person’s first appearance before the judicial officer.”172
Montalvo-Murillo held that failure to hold an immediate hearing
did not require release of the accused, rejecting the notion that
there exists a “presumption or general rule that for every duty
imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors
there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures
or omissions, even if negligent.”173
While the Court noted “the Act is silent on the issue of a
remedy for violations of its time limits,” this was not the end of
the Court’s discussion, just the beginning.174 The Court found it
necessary to read the provision in context, “seek[ing] only a
practical remedy, not one that strips the Government of all authority to act.”175 This led to an analysis of the statute’s purpose
and legislative history, which the Court found to be consistent
with its conclusion.176
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2012) (emphasis added).
Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. at 717.
174 Id. at 716.
175 Id. at 719.
176 Id. at 718–19. Thus, the Court found that “[a]utomatic release contravenes the object of the statute: to provide fair bail procedures while protecting
the safety of the public and assuring the appearance at trial of defendants found
likely to flee.” Id. at 720. It also found:
Assessing the situation in realistic and practical terms, it is
inevitable that, despite the most diligent efforts of the Government and the courts, some errors in the application of the time
requirements of § 3142(f) will occur. Detention proceedings
take place during the disordered period following arrest. As
this case well illustrates, circumstances such as the involvement of more than one district, doubts about whether the defendant was subject to temporary detention under § 3142(d),
and ambiguity in requests for continuances may contribute to
a missed deadline for which no real blame can be fixed. In these
situations, there is no reason to bestow upon the defendant a
windfall and to visit upon the Government and the citizens a
severe penalty by mandating release of possibly dangerous
defendants every time some deviation from the strictures of
§ 3142(f) occurs.
Id. By contrast, there is nothing “disordered” about the period starting with a
written Wells notification. Everything is under the Staff’s control. See Montford &
Co., Investment Advisors Act Release Nos. IA-3829; AP-3-14536, 108 SEC
Docket 3763, 3770 n.60 (May 2, 2014) (citation omitted). The Staff can ensure
that all its ducks are in a row before it provides the Wells notification, and, if
172
173
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Having established the shaky basis for Montford’s reliance placed on Brock, I turn to the key issue of the purpose of
section 4E as indicated on its face, illuminated by a reference to
its context and legislative history. Notably, the D.C. Circuit did
not discuss the purpose of section 4E, Dodd-Frank as a whole, or
any portion of this vast Act.177 Reference, therefore, must be
made to the Commission’s Opinion where it obliquely dealt with
statutory purpose as part of an overall analysis that the D.C.
Court found to be permissible.178
A.The Purpose of Section 4E: Painting with a Proper-Sized Brush
In discussing the purpose of section 4E, the Commission
painted with a very broad brush, indeed far too broad.179 It never
searched for evidence of Congressional intent concerning section
4E.180 Its comments on statutory purpose started off with a reference to the Act as a whole and its subtitle XII(B) (“Increasing
Regulatory Enforcement and Remedies”),181 within which section
4E was placed:
Section 4E was enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, a statute that significantly expanded the Commission’s authority to
police fraud in the securities industry. This particular provision
there is a bona fide basis for one or more extensions, it can obtain an extension
and postpone the deadline.
177 Montford & Co. v. SEC, 793 F.3d 76, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
178 In re Montford & Co. (Montford/SEC), Investment Advisors Act Release
No. 3829, 108 SEC Docket 3763, 3771–73 (May 2, 2014).
179 See id.
180 See id.
181 Id. at 3771 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 111-517, at 870–71 (2010)). DoddFrank was organized into 16 titles. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376ï86
(2010). One of these, Title IX (“Investor Protections and Improvements to the
Regulation of Securities”) was divided into 10 subtitles, numbered as A–J. Id.
at 1381–83. Section 929U—codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5, but adding to section 4 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, sec. 929U, § 4, 124 Stat. at
1867—was contained in subtitle B (“Increasing Regulatory Enforcement and
Remedies”), the “section” to which the Commission referred in its Opinion.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, sec. 929U, § 4, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5
(2012)); Montford/SEC, 108 SEC Docket at 3771.

360 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:323
was included under the [subtitle] of the Dodd-Frank Act titled
“Increasing Regulatory Enforcement and Remedies,” which
Congress explained at the time “strengthens the SEC’s authority to conduct investigations.”182

Then, taking note of a general Government-wide statute of limitations, contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462, the Commission further
opined:
In enacting Section 4E, Congress said nothing about creating a
new abbreviated statute of limitations, either as a replacement
for or a supplement to 28 U.S.C. § 2462. Moreover, it would be
inconsistent with Congress’s intent to increase our authority to
curb securities fraud under the Dodd-Frank Act section enacting
Section 4E to read the provision as limiting our ability to act
in a proceeding that otherwise meets the requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 2462. This is particularly true where, as here, dismissal
of the action would harm the investing public by foreclosing
the Commission from taking appropriate remedial measures.183

Had the Commission looked more closely at the legislative
history of section 4E, it would have found language that cast
serious doubt on the inference that its purpose was subsumed
within a larger statutory purpose of “strengthen[ing]” (i.e., enhancing) the Commission’s statutory powers.184 Instead, a fair
reading of the purpose of section 4E is that it stands on its own
and that it is surrounded by strong expressions of Congressional
dissatisfaction with the recent history of SEC enforcement.185
First, the context of section 4E(a)(1) makes clear it imposes
a deadline.186 A “deadline” is “a fixed time limit: a date or time before which something must be done and after which the opportunity
passes or a penalty follows.”187 This deadline says that the SEC
Montford/SEC, 108 SEC Docket at 3771 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 111517, at 870–71 (2010)).
183 Id. (footnotes omitted).
184 Compare id., with H.R. REP. NO. 111-687, pt. 1, at 46–47, 78 (2010).
185 See generally 156 CONG. REC. 9, 12430–34 (2010) (statement of Rep.
Kanjorski).
186 Congress recognized that Section 4E(a)(1) imposes a “deadline”—
section 4E is titled “Deadline for completing examinations, inspections and
enforcement actions,” and the very next subsection, (a)(2), expressly, twice,
refers to the 180-day period as “the deadline specified in paragraph (1).” Sec.
929U, § 4, 124 Stat. at 1867–68 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5 (2012)).
187 Deadline, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002).
182
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Staff must either file an action or inform their superiors of an
intent to drop the case by an easily determinable date, and it
was entirely within the Commission’s control whether to do so or
not.188 By contrast, Brock required a “determination” of misuse
of funds to completed by a date certain but did not require filing
an action by that date,189 and Good was focused on some internal reporting up deadlines as well as the commencement of a
forfeiture action after the Attorney General found such an action
warranted.190 Therefore on its face, the statute in Brock was
silent on whether an action must be brought, so there is an obvious uncertainty as to the consequence of missing the deadline,
and the statute in Good was inherently more ambiguous concerning the consequence of missing the reporting-up deadlines or
when a determination that follow-up was warranted was made.191
But not so in the case of section 4E, which required by the specified date certain, “the Commission staff [to] either file an action
against such person or provide notice to the Director of the Division of Enforcement of its intent to not file an action.”192 In other
words, a consequence of not suing by the deadline is expressly
stated: either sue or drop the case.193
Moreover, the light cast on section 4E’s meaning by pertinent legislative history is far different from what was described
by the Commission in its Opinion and cleared by the court.194 The
Conference Report on the enacted version of Dodd-Frank deals
directly with what became section 4E: “[Title IX Subtitle B, of DoddFrank] requires the SEC to complete investigations and examinations within certain time frames, subject to exceptions for
complex cases.”195 Virtually the same language was contained in
a House Report on H.R. 3817, an earlier version of section 4E:
“This section generally requires the SEC to complete enforcement
Sec. 929U, § 4, 124 Stat. at 1867–68 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5 (2012)).
Brock v. Pierce Cty., 476 U.S. 253, 254 (1986).
190 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993).
191 Compare Brock, 476 U.S. at 266, with Good, 510 U.S. at 64–65.
192 Sec. 929U, § 4, 124 Stat. at 1867 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5 (2012)).
193 See id.
194 Compare H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 871 (2010) and H.R. REP. NO. 111-687,
pt. 1, at 78 (2010), with Montford & Co. (Montford/SEC), Investment Advisors Act Release Nos. IA-3829; AP-3-14536, 108 SEC Docket 3763, 3771–73
(May 2, 2014).
195 H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 871.
188
189
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investigations within 180 days after staff provides a written Wells
notice to any person. The section contains exceptions for complex
actions.”196 This language does not speak of enhancing Commission enforcement authority; rather, it tends to narrow it.197 Moreover, it appears to leave no doubt as to Congress’s intent if the
Commission’s staff failed to file an action within the deadline,
and, to boot, it provided a safety valve for the Staff, to seek an
extension of the deadline.198
In addition, the Conference Report on Dodd-Frank, and the
rest of Dodd-Frank itself, say far more about Commission enforcement than that the Act “strengthens the SEC’s authority to
conduct investigations,”199 (which is how the Commission’s Opinion in Montford/SEC characterizes the purpose of section 4E).200
The statute as a whole, and especially Title IX, simply cannot be
seen simply as a bouquet thrown the Commission’s way.201 Instead,
it is filled with provisions aimed at changes in the Commission’s
overall operations.202
Thus, Subtitle A (“Increasing Investor Protection”),
establishes mechanisms to assist investors in their dealings
with the SEC by creating an Office of Investor Advocate and
an Ombudsman. It also creates an Investor Advisory Committee
at the SEC, and clarifies the authority of the SEC to engage
in investor testing. Subtitle A directs the SEC to study the
standards of care applicable to broker-dealers and investment
advisers giving investment advice to retail customers, and it
authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules imposing a fiduciary
duty on broker-dealers and investment advisers to protect retail
customers. In addition, the subtitle streamlines filing procedures
for self-regulatory organizations. Subtitle A also clarifies the
authority of the SEC to require investor disclosures before
purchase of investment products and services. Finally, the
H.R. REP. NO. 111-687, at 78.
See id.
198 See id.
199 H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 870.
200 Montford/SEC, 108 SEC Docket 3763, 3771.
201 See 156 CONG. REC. 9,12432 (2010) (statement of Rep. Kanjorski); see
also H.R. REP. NO. 111-687, at 46–47.
202 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 929U, § 4, 124 Stat. 1376, 1867–68 (2010) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5 (2012)); H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 871; see also H.R. REP.
NO. 111-687, at 78.
196
197
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subtitle requires studies on the enhancement of investment adviser examinations, financial literacy, mutual fund advertising,
conflicts of interest, improved investor access to information on
investment advisers and broker-dealers, and financial planners and the use of financial designations.203

Additionally, Title IX, Subtitle F (“Improvements to the
Management of the Securities and Exchange Commission”) “requires several reports designed to assess SEC performance and
provide recommendations for improvements ... related to internal
supervisory controls, personnel management, financial controls,
and oversight of national securities associations.”204 Subtitle F
also “requires the SEC to hire a consultant to study the SEC’s operations and determine whether there is a need for comprehensive
reform.”205 It also “creates a suggestion program for SEC employees and requires the Divisions of Trading and Markets and
Investment Management to have examiners on their staffs” and
“requires the GAO to study issues surrounding employees who
leave the SEC to work in the securities industry.”206
Thus, it is evident by the number of studies that this Title
required that Congress not only wanted to provide broader authority to the SEC in certain specified circumstances but also to
require the SEC to clean up its act in various areas.207 Moreover,
it is useful to recall the historical context in which Dodd-Frank was
enacted. It came on the heels of the worst financial crisis since
the Great Depression, and soon after the revelation of the Madoff
scandal, a multi-year, multibillion-dollar Ponzi scheme that the
SEC enforcement staff was handed on a silver platter, but somehow
managed to fail to uncover for years.208 In addition, at the same
H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 870.
Id. at 873.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 See id. at 870, 873–74.
208 See generally OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, SEC, OIG-509, INVESTIGATION
OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME at 1–2
(2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3DN
-HT54]. Ironically, one SEC Enforcement staffer told the SEC’s OIG that one
of the causes of the Commission’s failure to uncover what Madoff was up to
was that a key staffer was spending so much of her time closing old investigations. “That’s what [she] spent a lot of her time doing, writing closing
memos because she had inherited a branch where everybody had left and left
203
204
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time another massive securities fraud, Stanford, was allowed by
staff inaction to grow exponentially for fourteen years after the
SEC examiners had concluded this was likely a Ponzi scheme before
the Commission took enforcement action.209 As a result, many Congressmen and Senators were not happy with the SEC’s record.
B.The Views of the Sponsor of Section E
The SEC’s record was openly criticized210 by Rep. Paul E.
Kanjorski, Chair of the House Financial Services Subcommittee
on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises.211 On October 1, 2009, he issued a “discussion draft” of a
proposed bill, the Investor Protection Act of 2009, containing,
among other things, what seemed to amount to a statute of limitation: it would have required the SEC “to complete any examination, investigations, or enforcement action initiated by the
Commission not later than 180 days after the date on which
such examination, inspection, or enforcement action is commenced.”212 After significant modification, this provision was
these old cases in shambles, and you had to go back to the court records,
pulling all these court files, and recreating files to close them.” Id. at 366.
209 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, SEC, OIG-526, INVESTIGATION OF
THE SEC’S RESPONSE TO CONCERNS REGARDING ROBERT ALLEN STANFORD’S
ALLEGED PONZI SCHEME at 149 (2010), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig
/reports/investigations/2010/oig-526.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DES-Y9KW].
210 See generally The Stanford Ponzi Scheme: Lessons for Protecting Investors
from the Next Securities Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight and
Investigations of the H. Comm. On Fin. Services, 112th Cong. 1 (2012). In addition
to the SEC’s highly visible problems with respect to Madoff and Stanford, the OIG
issued a highly critical report on the then–Enforcement Director’s communication with her predecessor concerning the Commission’s ongoing investigation
of an entity not represented by the former Director. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL, SEC, OIG-502, ALLEGATIONS OF IMPROPER DISCLOSURES AND ASSURANCES GIVEN at 45–46 (2009), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports
/investigations/2009/oig-502.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWY6-DGVQ].
211 See Subcommittee Assignments for the 111th Congress, HOUSE FIN.
SERVS. COMMITTEE, https://web.archive.org/web/20100608223332/http://finan
cialservices.house.gov/subassignments.html [https://perma.cc/J67X-RPY4].
212 See Davis Polk Client Memorandum, Representative Kanjorski Releases
Investor Protection, Private Investment Fund Advisers Registration and Federal
Insurance Office Proposals, Oct. 6, 2009, https://www.davispolk.com/files/files
/Publication/948e554f-2037-4f0e-81eb-001bc52e4762/Preview/PublicationAttach
ment/43b23898-544a-4344-bfbb-9c30be53402c/100609_Kanjorski.pdf. There
is no record on why this draft provision was so substantially modified by the
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enacted in Dodd Frank as section 4E.213 Months before his introduction of H.R. 3817, his subcommittee had held hearings on the
Madoff fiasco, “using” in his words, “the largest known instance of
securities fraud as a case study to guide the work of the Financial
Services Committee in reshaping and reforming our Nation’s financial services regulatory system.”214 Chairman Kanjorski (also
Chairman of the Subcommittee) expressed the view that the
securities regulatory “motor is broken beyond repair. We therefore
need to invent a new engine to ensure that the securities regulatory system reflects today’s realities and can respond effectively to
tomorrow’s innovations.”215 When top Commission officials, citing
an ongoing investigation, refused to comment on the specifics of
the Madoff case, including why the SEC never caught the fraud,
Congressman Kanjorski had a strong reaction: “[T]he lack of cooperation shown in the last several weeks, and I think the abuse of
authority or the attempt to bring a protective shield over an executive agency or independent agency of this government is not acceptable.”216
Notably, he also expounded on the issue of excessive delays
in SEC enforcement:
Let me just say that justice delayed very often is justice denied.
And if we are going to have cooperation, and we are going to
have an effective enforcement tool of the Securities and Exchange Commission, we cannot have the culture or mentality
time it became law. One problem with the original version was that it required an “SEC enforcement action” (without clarifying whether this referred
only to an administrative proceeding or also to a civil action) to be completed
within 180 days of its commencement—far too short a period to give respondents or defendants an opportunity to prepare their defense and, in any event,
outside the control of the Commission if it were applied to a civil (court) action. See id. In any event, neither the SEC nor the Montford court commented
on the evolution of this provision in their respective opinions. See Montford &
Co. v. SEC (Montford/SEC), 793 F.3d 76, 81–83 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Montford &
Co., Investment Advisors Act Release Nos. IA-3829; AP-3-14536, 108 SEC
Docket 3763, 3771–73 (May 2, 2014).
213 H.R. REP. NO. 111-687, pt. 1, at 48 (2010).
214 Assessing The Madoff Ponzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 1 (2009),
http://library.clerk.house.gov/reference-files/111_fin_005.pdf [https://perma.cc
/XQK5-PD2X].
215 Id. at 2.
216 Id. at 59.
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that I sense over there that in examination and investigation,
a process can go on forever. I mean, I have stories that will
shrivel your ears with how long enforcement proceedings have
just laid around with no action having been taken. I am getting the impression that is the culture now, that there is not
an intent to do something.
So one of the things the committee will be considering in some
of this legislation is whether or not we can impose a 180-day
rule. You know, if we can get criminal prosecutions within 180
days in this country, it seems to me once we charge some corporate activity as being a violation of the SEC, let us move along;
180 days get to a trial, let us get it decided. Something like this.217

Later, during the markup of H.R. 3817, Rep. Kanjorski,
after reviewing the Inspector General’s Madoff Report, stated,
“‘it became eminently clear’ that the SEC was ‘a dysfunctional
agency’ that could not protect investors if it ‘does not implement
the laws’ Congress enacts.”218 Finally, when he spoke on the House
floor at the time the full House considered what had become
Dodd-Frank, Rep. Kanjorski made no secret of his belief that the
SEC needed more than new legislative authority to cure its problems.219 In addition to providing the SEC with more manpower,
the bill dealt with “the SEC’s systemic failures to effectively police
the markets in recent years,”220 which
required Congress to do even more to shake up the agency’s
daily operations. As such, the legislation includes my provision mandating an expeditious, independent, comprehensive
study of the securities regulatory regime by a high caliber body
with expertise in organizational restructuring to identify deficiencies and reforms, and ensure that the SEC and other regulatory entities put in place further improvements designed
to provide superior investor protection.221

He concluded with a direct reference to what would become section 4E: “The final bill also includes my deadlines generally forcing the SEC to complete enforcement, compliance examinations,
Id. at 61.
See Pet’r’s Br. at 24–25, Montford & Co. v. SEC, 793 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (quoting Representative Kanjorski, Remarks at the House Financial
Services Committee Mark-up (Oct. 27, 2009) (video recording), available at
http://financialserv.edgeboss.net/wmedia/financialserv/markup102709.wvx).
219 156 CONG. REC. 9,12432 (2010) (statement of Rep. Kanjorski).
220 Id.
221 Id.
217
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and inspections within 180 days, with some limited exemptions
for complex cases.”222 Manifestly, “forcing” a deadline on the
agency is far from promulgating a deadline that the SEC can
treat as an “internal timing directive.”223
The spoken and written words of Congressman Kanjorski
merit emphasis because of his role in the enactment of section
4E.224 Not only do they illustrate the depth of his dissatisfaction
with the performance of the SEC, but they support the conclusion that the purpose of section 4E was, as his remarks stated,
to “forc[e]” the SEC to act within the 180-day deadline or get an
extension.225 The SEC’s view, which is supported by the D.C.
Circuit, was that such an interpretation conflicted with the purportedly sole purpose of Title IX of Dodd-Frank, i.e., to buttress
the Commission’s authority.226 In reality, the remarks of section
4E’s sponsor and the other provisions of Dodd-Frank show that
the intent was not simply to increase Commission authority, but
also to require changes in its operations.227
IV.IS SECTION 4E DEAD?
While there is no guarantee that an attempt to convince a
court to interpret section 4E differently than it was interpreted in
Montford would be successful, it would appear that, where the
facts allow an argument that an SEC case was tardily filed under section 4E, it would be worth the attempt. This is because
the SEC and the courts, in viewing section 4E, misread Supreme
Id. (emphasis added).
Compare id., with Montford & Co. (Montford/SEC), Investment Advisors
Act Release Nos. IA-3829; AP-3-14536, 108 SEC Docket 3763, 3771–73 (May 2,
2014) (quoting U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 65 (1993)).
224 See 155 CONG. REC. 18,25035 (2009).
225 156 CONG. REC. 9,12432 (statement of Rep. Kanjorski).
226 See Montford/SEC, 108 SEC Docket at 3771–73; see also Montford and
Co. v. SEC, 793 F.3d 76, 82–83 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
227 The statements of the sponsor of legislation “are an authoritative guide
to the statute’s construction.” N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,
526–27 (1982); accord Brock v. Pierce Cty., 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986) (stating
an individual legislator’s remarks “should not be given controlling effect, but
when they are consistent with the statutory language and other legislative
history, they provide evidence of Congress’ intent.”). Thus, at least to the
extent that a particular Supreme Court majority is, today, willing to consider
legislative history, the statements of a statutory provision’s author merit a
level of special attention. See id.; N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. at 526ï27.
222
223
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Court precedent and overlooked significant evidence of legislative
intent that conflicts with the rather simplistic view that treating
section 4E as a statute of limitation conflicted with the purpose of
enacting subtitle IX of Dodd-Frank (strengthening the SEC’s enforcement arsenal).228 As I have shown, there is plenty of evidence
that Congress had the intention to, in Congressman Kanjorski’s
words, “forc[e]” the SEC to bring cases within the deadline.229
A final judicial resolution to what section 4E means ultimately awaits decision by the Supreme Court of the United
States. For the present, however, given the fact that there is no
inter-Circuit conflict, there is no immediate prospect that there
ever will be an occasion for the Court to determine what section
4E means. Thus, one might conclude that we lawyers can only
reach our own private conclusions unless we have a client that
can and will test this issue in litigation. But before we conclude
that a court case is the only way to solve this problem, let us
consider the possible role of the SEC or the Congress.
Is there any hope that a future SEC will decide to reinterpret section 4E and treat it like a limitations statute? The fact is
that, given the safety valve enacted into the statute by the addition of the possibility of an extension ad infinitum, even were the
Commission so to decide, this action would be of dubious significance unless the Staff or the Commission were to take the initiative by deciding to limit the number or length of extensions.230
Even if no such change were enacted, the Staff or the Commission
can turn down meritless extension requests—extensions caused by
sheer inefficiency or foot-dragging.231 If flimsy extension requests
were denied, “violations” of the statute would appear almost
impossible if someone at the SEC is minding the store.232 Then,
assuming proper planning on the part of the Staff, such violations
228 See Brock, 476 U.S. at 263; N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. at 526ï27.
Compare Montford & Co. (Montford/SEC), Investment Advisors Act Release
Nos. IA-3829; AP-3-14536, 108 SEC Docket 3763, 3771–73 (May 2, 2014),
affirming Montford/ALJ, Admin. Proc. No. 3-14536 (Apr. 20, 2012), with 156
CONG. REC. 9,12432 (2010) (statement of Rep. Kanjorski).
229 156 CONG. REC. 9,12432 (2010) (statement of Rep. Kanjorski); see H.R.
REP. NO. 111-687, pt. 1, at 78 (2010).
230 See Montford & Co., 793 F.3d at 83 (holding section 4E’s 180-day time
limit is not “jurisdictional”).
231 See id.
232 See id.
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would occur only if a particular request for an extension is so
unreasonable that it is, unexpectedly, not granted.233
Thus, properly understood, section 4E should not be
viewed as much of a shackle as far as the Commission or its staff
are concerned.234 If the statute is not to be rendered a complete
nullity, the Commission would be well-advised to adopt a new
interpretation of this section and give it the teeth its Staff needs
to understand the need to avoid the age-old problem of excessive
delay. However, realism intrudes and suggests that there is virtually no chance any of this would happen: if the Commission
felt that a particular staff recommendation took too long to reach
“the table,” as Commission consideration was called in my day,
then it can always deny the recommendation.
Finally, the issue can be reconsidered in Congress. Surely
Congress could make the statute clearer and, perhaps, even wiser.
As far as clarity is concerned, if Congress either believed that
the original statute, as enacted, was intended to act as a limitations statute, or concluded that, whatever the intent of Congress
in enacting section 4E, making it a limitations statute would be
wise policy, it could either instruct the SEC in, say, an appropriations bill to “reinterpret” section 4E, or it could amend it by
explicitly stating that it is a limitations statute (or by clarifying
in no uncertain term that filing or closing was required within
180 days of a Wells notification, or some other measurement of a
deadline). Congress could create a new, shorter limitations period
for SEC enforcement proceedings than the general federal limitations statute, which establishes a limitation period of five
years from when “the claim first accrued.”235 Or Congress could
add more days to the 180-day deadline and permit only one 90day extension.236 The alternatives are endless, and all would be
an improvement on the status quo.
In the meantime, were a defendant or respondent litigating an enforcement case with the SEC to raise a section 4E defense if one were available, there is a strong basis to attempt to
persuade a court of appeal that Montford was wrongly decided.

See id.
See id.
235 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012).
236 See id.
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